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Article: 
It is commonly accepted that one can be morally responsible for negligent behavior and its consequences. It 
is also commonly accepted that one cannot be morally responsible for occurrences over which one had no 
control. It is not clear how these beliefs are to be reconciled; for negligent behavior involves inadvertence, 
and yet the control which appears requisite for moral responsibility itself seems to require that one advert to 
one's behavior and its consequences. In this paper I shall provide an account of negligence according to 
which negligence involves both advertence and inadvertence to one and the same event, and I shall thereby 
seek to show how it is that one can be morally responsible for negligent behavior and its consequences. The 
paper will have two main sections: in the first I shall present my account of negligence, and in the second I 
shall discuss moral responsibility for negligence. There will be two appendices: in the first I shall discuss the 
issue of legal responsibility for negligence, and in the second I shall discuss the concepts of rashness and 
recklessness. 
 
1. NEGLIGENCE 
Consider Bert, a bricklayer. Bert had been laying bricks for many years, and he had developed several habits 
in the process. One such habit was that of tossing defective bricks over his shoulder. Normally, this was quite 
safe, given the conditions where Bert usually worked. But one day Bert was asked to fill in for a sick worker 
who had been working at the top of a new high-rise. He agreed to do so. When at the top of the building, 
Bert unthinkingly engaged in his well-entrenched habit and tossed a defective brick over his shoulder. It 
landed on a pedestrian passing by below and killed him.1  
 
Is this a case of negligence? It could well be. At least one of the conditions necessary for its being so is 
satisfied, and this is that, at the time he threw the brick, Bert did not advert to (that is, consciously entertain) 
the possibility that he might thereby cause damage or injury. But this would not suffice for its being a case of 
negligence. What else is needed? Among other things, I would contend, the following: that, at some time 
earlier than that at which he threw the brick, Bert did advert to the possibility that he might engage in such 
activity and thereby cause damage or injury. It is this fact, I shall maintain, which removes the obstacle that 
some have thought impedes the proper ascription of moral responsibility to persons for their negligence. 
 
But let us approach this gradually. It is clear that the sort of advertence-cum-inadvertence which I have just 
roughly outlined is also not sufficient for behaving negligently. Negligent behavior is, in addition, 
unjustifiable; there is something wrong about it; if the person who commits the negligence is morally 
responsible for doing so, he is blameworthy for doing so. Negligence, then, is unjustifiable advertence-cum-
inadvertence.2 It will prove useful first to spell out what the advertence-cum-inadvertence consists in, 
whether justifiable or not, and then to turn to negligence in particular. 
 
I shall call the general sort of advertence-cum-inadvertence that concerns us here neglect.3 Thus, negligence 
is unjustifiable neglect. But what, more precisely, is neglect? Let us return to the case of Bert. In order for his 
behavior to be neglectful, it was said, Bert must (i) not have adverted to the possibility of causing damage or 
injury at the time he threw the brick, but (ii) have adverted to this possibility earlier. Now, if he did advert to 
this possibility earlier, it seems that he did not act on such advertence; for there is no indication that he 
sought to take any precautions, that is, to prevent himself from engaging in his potentially harmful habit. Let 
us suppose that, indeed, he did not act on such advertence; this, too, I think is necessary for his behavior to 
be neglectful. In fact, I think that we now have, in rough outline, all the ingredients necessary for neglectful 
behavior. That is, roughly, neglect consists in advertence cum failure to act on advertence cum inadvertence. 
More precisely, but still somewhat roughly, I purpose: 
 
Def. 1: P's action a at t2 is neglectful (to some degree) with respect to event e if and only if for some set 
B of actions bl, . . . ,bn:  
(i) P occurrently believes at t1 that 
(a) he can perform each of the members of B at t2, 
(b) if he performs none of these actions at t2, then there is a non-zero probability that e will 
occur at t3, and 
(c) the members of B constitute precautionary measures, in ascending order of probable 
efficacy, against the occurrence of e at t3; 
(ii) there are no actions other than b1, . . . ,bn such that P occurrently believes at t1 that 
(a) he can perform each of these other actions at t2, and 
(b) each of these other actions constitutes a precautionary measure of some probable efficacy 
against the occurrence of e at t3; and 
(iii) for some bi in B, 
(a) P decides at t1 not to do any of bi, bi +1, . . . , bn, and 
(b) P does a at t2, thereby unthinkingly neither doing, nor even attempting to do, any of bi, bi 
+1, …, bn.4 
 
For any person satisfying what is said of P and any actions satisfying what is said of bi, bi +1, . . . , bn in 
Def.1, we may say that the person neglects to do these actions. Def.1 is itself quite complicated, however, 
and calls for some comment. 
 
First, in Def.1, and in all such formulas to follow, I implicitly treat events (and, among them, actions) as 
abstract, finely-grained entities—the sort of things which may recur and also co-occur at the same time and 
place. In short, I treat them as a species of states of affairs.5 A treatment of events as concrete or coarsely-
grained would require a somewhat different phraseology—including, presumably, appeal to act-types and 
act-descriptions. I assume that a translation into this phraseology from my way of putting things here could 
be achieved, but I shall not try to provide it. 
 
Second, for simplicity's sake, I have restricted "a" and the various "b's" in Def.1 to ranging over actions, 
although in fact I see no reason why they may not be allowed to range over omissions also (if these are not 
actions, as I suspect.6 Some writers7, indeed, say that only omissions can be negligent, and that actions which 
manifest the same characteristics are to be called heedless. I shall not enter into this terminological dispute 
here, although it is pertinent to note that even actions which are neglectful do, according to clause (iii)(b) of 
Def.1, typically involve omissions.8) 
 
Third, the time-variables are to be understood as follows: t1 is earlier than t2 and t2 earlier than t3, and each 
may be not just a moment but a period in time (such that "at t1 (t2, t3)" may be understood as "at or during t1 
(t2, t3)"). 
 
Fourth, clause (iii)(a) stipulates that P's action is neglectful only if he decides not to take both (1) a 
precautionary measure and (2) any probably more effective precautionary measure. (2) is important; it would 
not do to say that P is neglectful if he decides not to take a precautionary measure bi when he does decide to 
take what is probably a more effective precautionary measure bj. (Similarly, it would not do to say that P is 
neglectful if he decides not to take any of the precautionary measures bi, . . . ,bn when he does decide to take 
what is probably a more effective precautionry measure which is not a member of B. This possibility is ruled 
out by clause (ii), which in effect says that B is "maximal" in the required sense.) 
 
Fifth, the use of "unthinkingly" in clause (iii)(b) is supposed to cover inadvertence not only to bi, . . . ,bn but 
also to e itself. 
 
Sixth, Def.1 does not require that e occur at t3. It is possible that an event be probable and yet, so long as the 
probability is less than 1, fail to occur. But if e, or any other event, does occur at least in part because of the 
inadequate precautions taken by P, then P may be said to have neglectfully caused it to occur. Now even if e 
fails to occur, P's action a may be said to be neglectful with respect to it and P may be said to neglect to do 
the actions in set B. Indeed, this is so even if P's belief in clause (i) (namely, that he can perform the actions 
in set B and that e will probably occur if he fails to perform these actions) is false or epistemically unjustified 
(or both); for the decision in clause (iii) is predicated on this belief, whether or not it is false or unjustified.9 
 
Seventh, Def.1 is compatible with the theoretical possibility that there be "chains" of neglect and negligence. 
It might be that the belief in clause (i) or the decision in clause (iii) (or both) is itself (or are themselves) 
neglectfully caused to occur. Whether such chains ever in fact occur is difficult to determine, although I 
suspect that some short ones do. Whenever there is such a chain, there must (on pain of infinite regress) be a 
first link where the neglect is basic, in that neither the belief in clause (i) nor the decision in clause (iii) is 
itself neglectful. 
 
Finally, there is mention of degrees of neglect; I shall return to this shortly. 
 
Def.1 of course captures what it was designed to capture: advertence (clause (i)) cum failure to act on 
advertence (clause (iii)) cum inadvertence (clause (iii)(b)). It allows us, for example, to diagnose the case of 
Bert as a case of neglect, given that Bert did at some time think of taking some precautionary measure (such 
as erecting a protective screen behind his back) but decided not to do so. But, even if it is accurate, Def.1 
characterizes only neglect, and not negligence, for certainly it is possible for neglect to be justifiable. For 
example, it may occur to me on Friday that there is some chance that I will forget to keep a routine 
appointment in my office Monday morning, and that, if I go there immediately, place a large notice "Stay 
Until Noon Monday" on the inside of the door, and spend the weekend there, that would probably be an 
effective precautionary measure against breaking the appointment; but, if I neglect to do all this, such neglect 
is not unjustifiable and does not constitute negligence. On the other hand, another precautionary measure 
may also occur to me—probably less effective than the first, but probably effective nonetheless and certainly 
better than nothing—and that is to write myself a note as a reminder and leave it in a place where I am likely 
to see and read it before Monday's appointment; and if I neglect to do this, this neglect may well be 
unjustifiable and constitute negligence. Given Def.1, negligence is easily defined. I think that the following 
should do: 
 
Def.2: P's action a at t2 is negligent (to some degree) with respect to an event e if and only if . . .[just as 
in Def.1, except that clause (iii)(a) reads "P unjustifiably decides" instead of "P decides").10 
 
(Def.2 is, of course, subject to the same remarks and qualifications as Def.1.) Notice that Def.2 says only that 
P unjustifiably decides not to do any of bi, bi +1, . . . , bn. This leaves open the possibility that it is justifiable 
for him to decide not to do bn; it is perhaps only bi (and "lesser" measures) which it is unjustifiable for him 
to decide not to perform. It is not my purpose here to try to say just what makes a decision unjustifiable, and 
so I shall not be concerned with how it is that one may tell that a case is a case of negligence rather than of 
justifiable neglect. That is a separate, and very difficult, issue. 
 
Negligence comes in degrees and, because it does, it seems fair to say that neglect does also. But let us start 
with negligence. A distinction that is commonly made—especially in the law—is that between negligence 
that is gross and negligence that is not gross; indeed, sometimes degrees of grossness are admitted.11 It has 
been said that the notion of degrees of negligence is nonsensical because inadvertence does not come in 
degrees.12 This, of course, is a non sequitur, for negligence does not consist solely in inadvertence. Indeed, 
so far as I can tell, there may be degrees of negligence on at least three counts. First, the degree of negligence 
may be said (1) to vary directly with what the agent believed to be the probability of the event e's occurring 
had no precautions been taken but also, consistently with this, (2) to correlate inversely with the size of the 
"gap" between what the agent believed to be the probability of the event e's occurring had no precautions 
been taken and what he believed to be the probability of its occurring given the precautions that he in fact 
decided to take. For (1) the less likely the event "in its original setting," the less the negligence in not 
preventing it; but also (2) the greater the gap mentioned, the better the precautions and thus the less the 
negligence, and the smaller the gap, the worse the precautions and thus the more the negligence.13 For 
example, (1) Bert's deciding to take no precautions concerning his brick-tossing was the more negligent the 
more likely he thought injury otherwise to occur. Also (2) this decision was more negligent than his deciding 
to take certain probably ineffective, but at least possibly effective, precautions; but he may still be guilty of 
negligence even if he decided to take these inadequate precautions. Second, the degree of negligence may be 
said to vary directly with the moral "seriousness" of the omission involved when P does a.14 For example, 
Bert's causing damage or injury—indeed (as it turns out) his killing someone—is more serious than my 
failure to keep my routine appointment. (Of course, such seriousness is itself pertinent to drawing the line 
between negligence and justifiable neglect, but it is also pertinent to drawing lines—corresponding to 
degrees—within the area of negligence.) Third, the degree of negligence may be said to vary directly with 
the ease with which the precautions in question may be taken.15 Ease, in this context, may be seen to be a 
broad concept, comprising not just ease of achievement relative to the capacities of the agent P, but also ease 
of achievement relative to any risks involved to which P or others may be exposed. For example, if it would 
have been very difficult and/or risky for Bert to erect a protective screen behind him, then, in so far forth, the 
degree of negligence involved in his throwing the brick over his shoulder is diminished. (Again, this third 
consideration is pertinent also to drawing the line between negligence and justifiable neglect.) 
 
There may be other respects in which degrees of negligence may be measured, but it seems clear that there 
are at least these three. Just how to combine these three respects—if, indeed, they are commensurate at all—
to come up with a single, overall figure for "the" degree to which an action is negligent, is a matter that I 
shall not try to tackle, although it seems clear to me that we often do engage in some such calculation when 
assessing actions such as Bert's. In addition, it seems fair to say that there are degrees of neglect also; for, 
given the foregoing, it seems reasonable to say that neglect in general comes in degrees at least on the first 
count mentioned (that concerning the probability of e), if not on the second (seriousness) and third (ease), the 
latter two considerations being pertinent only to the question of the justifiability of neglect. 
 
2. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE 
Think of Sam, a shopper. Walking down the high-street, he passed a certain department store. Had he gone 
in, he would have been its millionth customer and won a fabulous prize; but he knew nothing of this, and 
walked on by. 
 
Clearly there is a sense in which Sam could have been the millionth customer. Unlike someone a thousand 
miles from the store, he was free to walk into the store and thereby win the prize, just as he was free to walk 
past the store and thereby fail to win the prize. Thus, clearly, there is a sense in which Sam was in control of 
his winning the prize. We may call this sort of control standard control. Just as clearly, however, there is a 
sense in which Sam was not in control of his winning the prize, simply because he had never adverted to the 
possibility of doing so and was therefore ignorant of the opportunity to do so. We may call this sort of 
control enhanced control. And it seems that, not only standard, but enhanced control is required for moral 
responsibility. At least, the absence of such control in this case appears to be the very reason why we would 
want to absolve Sam of all blame for not winning the prize. It might be understandable if, on finding out 
what he had done, Sam's wife berated him; but it would not be fair. In an important sense, it was beyond his 
control. 
 
It is for some such reason as the foregoing, I think, that many have said that the matters to which one fails to 
advert are not things for which one can be properly held morally responsible. But while this may be a general 
truth, it admits of exceptions, and the exceptions are important. For something may be out of one's control at 
the time that one does it (or fails to do it) and yet not be out of one's control entirely—and the fact that it is 
not out of one's control entirely provides the opportunity for one's being properly held morally responsible 
for doing it (or failing to do it). For example, I may take a pill now which I fully expect to make me wittingly 
but irresistibly run amok an hour from now and thereby cause considerable damage; if in an hour I do so run 
amok and cause damage, then (given certain other assumptions) I am morally responsible for the damage I 
cause—even though, at the time I cause the damage, my actions are beyond my control. For I could have 
prevented the damage; there was an earlier time at which my later causing of the damage was in my control. 
We may say: although my causing the damage was not in my immediate control, it was in my remote control. 
 
It is just this sort of picture that I wish to draw of negligence. There is nothing special about moral 
responsibility for negligent behavior; it provides no exception to the rule that there is no moral responsibility 
for actions (or omissions) that are beyond one's control. True, the inadvertence at the time (t2, in Def.1 and 
Def.2) of the omission renders the omission beyond the agent's control at that time, but this fact does not 
render the omission beyond the agent's control entirely. On the contrary, the control requisite for moral 
responsibility may be, and often is, anchored in the earlier advertence (at t1). In short, the picture is this. 
Enhanced control appears to be required for moral responsibility. (I shall not seek to prove this claim, but the 
case of Sam and similar cases surely tend to confirm it.) It is still possible to maintain that someone can be 
morally responsible for negligent behavior and its consequences, however, once it is seen, first, that 
negligence involves advertence as well as inadvertence and, second, that control may be remote as well as 
immediate. 
 
But while this picture may serve to rebut the contention that one can never be properly held morally 
responsible for negligent behavior and its consequences, it is important to note that it seems not to warrant 
the widespread ascription of moral responsibility in which many, perhaps most, wish to indulge. And this 
may seem to be a defect in my account. After all (it may be objected) this account stipulates that all 
negligence involves actual foresight (at t1) of the action (a) and its consequence (e), while all that negligence 
need involve is that these be foreseeable, and one may be morally responsible for an event which is 
foreseeable, even if one never in fact foresees it. I shall now address this objection. 
 
Hitherto I have not talked of foresight, but I agree that my account stipulates that negligence involves 
foresight. For I think we may say, for at least one respectable sense of "foresee" (where t1 is earlier than t2): 
 
Def.3: P foresees at t1 (to some degree) that e will occur at t2 if and only if P occurrently believes at t1 
that (there is some probability that) e will occur at t2.16 
 
Now, in order to assess whether or not I am correct in insisting that negligence involves foresight rather than 
mere foreseeability without foresight, we must ask what foreseeability is. Several different answers suggest 
themselves. I shall consider three. It will be seen that it is not at all obvious that, on any of these 
interpretations of "foreseeability," the thesis that all negligence involves foresight is to be abandoned. 
 
The first sense of “foreseeability” that I shall consider is that which the law invokes. It is this: 
 
Def.4: e's occurring at t2 is foreseeable (to some degree) by P at t1 if and only if the reasonable man 
would foresee at t1 (to some degree) that e would occur at t2. 
 
While there may be good reason to adopt this definition for purposes of the law,17 it is apparent that there are 
many problems with it from the moral point of view. One problem, of course, is that of understanding who 
and what the "reasonable man" is. Another problem consists in determining what the reasonable man would 
foresee, even when we have determined who he is and what general characteristics he has. But by far the 
biggest problem, it seems to me, is that of justifying this approach to foreseeability when it is moral, and not 
legal, responsibility that is at issue. How is it relevant, when trying to determine whether or not a particular 
person is morally responsible for a particular event, whether or not the "reasonable man" would have 
foreseen, it? If the person in question falls short of this criterion of reasonability then how is it justifiable to 
judge him by it (unless, of course, he is morally responsible for falling short of it)? On the other hand, if the 
person in question surpasses this criterion, it might be that to judge him by it (and it alone) is to treat him too 
leniently. In either case, it is surely to the person in question that we must look, and not to some criterion 
which may bear no relevance to him and to his capacities, when trying to determine moral responsibility. 
 
It is noteworthy that Def.4 does not give us a straightforward interpretation of the term "foreseeable," in that 
an event may be foreseeable by a person, according to this definition, without that person being able, in any 
standard sense, to foresee it. A more obvious way to construct interpretations of the term is, first, to devise 
the following schema: 
 
Def.5: e's occurring at t2 is foreseeable (to some degree) by P at t1 if and only if it is possible that P 
foresee at t1 (to some degree) that e will occur at t2. 
 
One may then provide instantiations of this schema by making precise the sense of "possible" that is at issue. 
Here are two such instantiations that I shall discuss: 
 
Def.5.1: [just as in Def.5, except that it reads "logically possible" instead of "possible"] 
Def.5.2: [just as in Def.5, except that it reads "personally possible" instead of "possible"] 
 
I include Def.5.1 here for illustrative purposes only. I know of no one who accepts the definition in the 
present context, and this is just as well; for it is far too liberal. Suppose that whatever other conditions (such 
as freedom of action) are necessary for being morally responsible for an event are satisfied, and suppose that 
some-one does not in fact foresee the event (to any degree) but that it is logically possible that he foresee it 
(to some degree). Would this suffice for the person's being morally responsible for the event? Surely not. For 
such foreseeability will not guarantee that one has the enhanced control that appears requisite for moral 
responsibility. Any number of "chain-reactions" of events may serve to illustrate this. For instance, suppose 
that I want to know the time, that my turning my wrist to consult my watch causes the sun to be reflected into 
the eyes of a distant pedestrian, that this pedestrian is temporarily blinded and bumps into a street vendor's 
cart, that the cart is thereby caused to capsize, its contents of apples and oranges spilling on to the street, that 
the horse attached to a passing horse-drawn carriage is frightened by this turn of events, shies from the fruit, 
and thereby causes extensive damage to the carriage and its occupants. Am I morally responsible for the 
damage to the carriage and its occupants? Surely not. Was it foreseeable, in the sense of Def.5. 1? Yes. 
 
Of course, there are many ways to furnish more restrictive senses of "possible" so as to come up with less 
liberal instantiations of Def.5 than Def.5.1. However, there is only one which seems to me of merit, namely, 
Def.5.2. Indeed, it is Def.5.2 to which, I believe, very many subscribe. By "personal possibility" I mean that 
possibility which is operative in "can"-contexts of the sort which are at the heart of the debate concerning 
determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility and are commonly discussed in terms of the phrase "could 
have done otherwise." Moreover, it is this type of possibility which is at issue in the slogan " 'ought' implies 
'can,' " at least on some understandings of this slogan. And this is important. For I think that foreseeability is 
so often taken to be an element of negligence because, first, it is so often said that someone ought to have 
foreseen something that he did not foresee and, second, it is assumed that this implies that he could have 
foreseen what he in fact did not foresee; and it is thought that, all else being equal, this suffices for the person 
to be morally responsible for the event in question. 
 
But is this popular picture of foreseeability as an element of negligence acceptable? The answer, I think, is 
this: yes, but it does not contradict the claim that all negligence involves foresight. It must be remembered 
that the "can" which expresses the sort of possibility presently at issue, and the "ought" which rides on this 
"can," standardly modify verbs of action. Now, foreseeing is not an action; to say "I ought to foresee e" and 
"I can foresee e" is therefore puzzling. It seems to me, however, that sense can be made of these phrases if 
they are understood to be elliptical for "I ought to make myself foresee e" and "I can make myself foresee e"; 
for here the "ought" and the "can" explicitly modify a verb of action. If this is correct, then the more 
common "I ought to have foreseen e" and "I could have foreseen e" are to be understood, respectively, as 
elliptical for "I ought to have made myself foresee e" and "I could have made myself foresee e." And it does 
seem appropriate to utter such sentences in cases of negligence. Consider Bert once again. Suppose that he 
unthinkingly threw the brick over his shoulder at t2 and that this caused the pedestrian's death to occur at t3, 
and let us assume that this is a case of negligent behavior on Bert's part. I think that it is then quite correct to 
say all of the following: Bert did not foresee (to any degree) at t2 that harm would occur at t3; the harm's 
occurring at t3 was foreseeable (to some degree) by Bert at t2—in the sense of "foreseeable" presently at 
issue, i.e., that of Def.5.2; and Bert ought at t2 to have foreseen (to some degree) that harm would occur at 
t3. But all of this may be accepted because of the further stipulation that Bert did advert to and thereby 
foresee the possibility of harm at an earlier time t1. It is because of this advertence at t1 that it may be said 
that he could have foreseen at t2 (that is, could have made himself foresee), but did not foresee at t2, the 
possibility of harm at t3. Without the advertence at t1, the foresight at t2 would have been beyond his control 
and, hence, the harm at t3 would have been beyond his control also, in just that strong sense of "control" in 
which Sam's winning the prize was beyond his control. But with the advertence at t1, the harm at t3 was in 
Bert's control, and this is what opens the door for the ascription of moral responsibility. 
 
It might be countered: while it is of course true that both the foresight at t2 and the harm at t3 would not have 
been in Bert's enhanced control without the advertence at t1, still both might have been in his standard 
control, and this would have sufficed, certeris paribus, for ascribing moral responsibility to Bert for the harm 
at t3. I am not sure how best to respond to this. I admit that I have provided no argument to prove that 
enhanced control is required for moral responsibility, but I think that the case of Sam and similar cases surely 
renders this claim plausible. Moreover, if an account of negligence can be given which is compatible with 
this claim and which both accommodates our talk of foreseeability and preserves our intuition that it is 
possible to be morally responsible for negligent behavior, then the claim is surely rendered even more 
plausible. The account that I have given is of this sort. Of course, as I have noted, this account does not 
permit the widespread ascription of moral responsibility in which many indulge. I take this, however, to be a 
mark against such ascription rather than a mark against the account. At least, this is my tentative conclusion, 
in the absence of any further considerations to the contrary. 
 
There are two final points that I wish to make. First, I have been concerned to stress that one may be morally 
responsible for negligent behavior and its consequences. I have of course not said that one must be; for other 
conditions necessary for moral responsibility (such as freedom of action) may be lacking.18 Still, it is 
appropriate to ask here whether one of the conditions necessary for a person's being morally responsible for 
an event e is that e would not have occurred despite whatever precautions he might have decided to take to 
prevent it. My inclination is to answer "No" to this. It was noted in Section 1 that it seems correct to say that 
P neglects to do bi, . . . ,bn (as these variables feature in Def.1), even if his belief that he can do any of them 
is false or epistemically unjustified and even if e fails to occur; and if P's decision not to do any of bi, . . . ,bn 
is unjustifiable, then he is negligent (according to Def.2). What is important here, it seems to me, is P's state 
of mind; it is on this that we should focus when judging him from the moral point of view. Of course, P 
cannot be morally responsible for e itself unless e occurs; but the fact that it would have occurred no matter 
what precautions he had taken seems to me not to eliminate his responsibility for it. This is controversial, of 
course.19 In a sense it perhaps does not matter what we decide to say on this issue since, whether or not we 
say that P is morally responsible for e, there is no disagreement that (all else being equal) he is morally 
responsible for deciding not to prevent it. On the other hand, there are similar cases of "overdetermination" 
where it certainly would seem improper not to hold a person morally responsible for the overdetermined 
event. Suppose that P1 and P2 simultaneously flip separate switches, each knowing that his own flipping is 
sufficient under the circumstances to detonate a bomb. It seems quite perverse to say that neither is morally 
responsible for the bomb's exploding simply because this event would have occurred even if he had not 
flipped his switch.20 If this is so, I cannot see why negligent (as opposed to knowing) switch-flipping should 
not be treated in the same way. 
 
Second, I have claimed that moral responsibility requires enhanced control, and I take this to imply that one 
is not morally responsible for an event unless one has adverted to it.21 Having this implication, the claim may 
appear to be a radical one. After all, while Bert foresaw the possibility that he would injure someone if he 
continued to indulge unthinkingly in his habit of tossing defective bricks over his shoulder, it may not have 
occurred to him that he would kill someone, and presumably it did not occur to him that he would kill the 
particular person (call him Pete) that he did kill—someone (we may assume) with whom he was not 
acquainted. My account, then, commits me to saying that Bert is not morally responsible for killing Pete. But 
this is not really such a radical claim, especially inasmuch as it is based on a treatment of events as finely-
grained. For there is, of course, no denying that Bert is morally responsible for injuring someone; in addition, 
it seems to me perverse to contend that there is some blame that is Bert's due for killing Pete over and above 
the blame that is his due for injuring someone. 
 
APPENDIX A: LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE 
There has been comparatively little direct discussion in the literature of the issue of whether or not it is ever 
correct to hold someone morally responsible for negligence. (Call this the moral issue.) There has been a 
good deal of discussion, however, of the related issue of whether or not it is ever morally justifiable to hold 
someone legally responsible for negligence. (Call this the legal issue.) In this appendix I shall first comment 
on the way the legal issue has been traditionally approached and then point out how resolution of this issue is 
aided, but not achieved, by a resolution (of the sort that I have attempted in this paper) of the moral issue. 
 
There is clearly something morally repugnant (or odious, to use Hart's term22) about holding someone legally 
responsible for something for which he is believed not to be morally responsible, some opinions to the 
contrary notwithstanding.23 For holding someone legally responsible for something involves making certain 
impositions on him, impositions which seem unfair in light of the belief that he is not morally responsible for 
the thing in question. (Let us use the term "liability" instead of "legal responsibility" in order to conform our 
discussion with that of others.) There is a sort of derivative repugnance associated with holding someone 
liable for an offense without taking into account whether or not he is morally responsible for that offense. 
Now, suppose we were to accept the following definition: 
 
Def.6: Liability for an offense is strict if and only if its imposition is not conditional upon the agent's 
being found to be morally responsible for that offense. 
 
It would follow that strict liability is derivatively repugnant. If we were thus to accept the derivative 
repugnance of strict liability, then we might be tempted to try to ascertain whether or not liability for 
negligent behavior is repugnant by ascertaining whether or not it is strict. Indeed, the traditional approach to 
the legal issue seems to have been just this. In the classic Turner-Hart debate, we find Turner and Hart 
agreeing that strict liability is repugnant but disagreeing about whether or not liability for negligence is 
repugnant.24 Turner's argument (or part of it) seems, in outline, to be this: 
 
(I)   (a) Strict liability is repugnant. 
(b) Liability for negligent behavior is strict. 
Therefore (c) Liability for negligent behavior is repugnant. 
 
But Hart's argument (or part of it) seems, in outline, to be this: 
 
(II)  (a) Strict liability is repugnant. 
(not-c) Liability for negligent behavior is not repugnant. 
Therefore  (not-b) Liability for negligent behavior is not strict. 
 
This might seem like a reasonable approach. For, with (a) agreed upon, all one needs to do is look at (b) and 
(c) and try to find reasons for affirming one or denying the other. But the reasonableness of this approach is 
illusory, for agreement on the truth of (a) has been premature. 
 
The trouble is, it is not Def.6 that has featured in the traditional debate concerning liability for negligence. 
Rather, the definition at work is this: 
 
Def.7: Liability for an offense (an actus reus) is strict if and only if its imposition is not conditional upon 
the agent's being found to have possessed mens rea with respect to that offense. 
 
How can we get (a) out of Def.7? Well, the following would do it: 
 
(1) One is morally responsible for an offense only if one possessed mens rea with respect to that offense. 
 
But is (1) true? I have no idea. The real problem here—a simple but devastating one—is that the term "mens 
rea" is obviously a term of art and yet there is no commonly accepted definition of it.25 For this reason, the 
traditional approach to the legal issue by way of a discussion of strict liability has served, for the most part, 
only to obfuscate the issue. Were the phrase "strict liability" to be understood in terms of Def.6, the issue 
would not be obfuscated; but it is clearly Def.7 to which most participants in the discussion subscribe—
including Turner and Hart. Given this fact, premise (a) in arguments (I) and (II) remains unclear, and so the 
soundness of the arguments cannot be ascertained. Indeed, given that it is Def.7 that is operative, neither (I) 
nor (II) has any clear advantage over the remaining alternative argument: 
 
(III) (b) Liability for negligent behavior is strict. 
(not-c) Liability for negligent behavior is not repugnant. 
Therefore  (not-a) Strict liability is not repugnant.26 
 
It may appear that I have been too hasty in this brief criticism of the traditional approach to the issue of 
liability for negligence. After all (it may be pointed out) even if no clear definition of "mens rea" is 
forthcoming, nevertheless partial characterizations of the concept that is supposed to be expressed by this 
term are to be found in the literature. In particular, almost all seem to accept the following claim: 
 
(2) One possesses mens rea with respect to an offense only if one adverts to it. 
 
And I have already indicated in the main body of the paper that I accept the following: 
 
(3) One is morally responsible for an offense only if one adverted to it. 
 
But, of course, this is of no help. (1) and (2) do yield (3); but it is not (3) that is in question, at this point, but 
(1). If the "only if ' of (2) were replaced by or supplemented with an "if," then (2) and (3) would yield (1); 
but I know of no writer who would accept (2) so amended. 
 
Rather than invoke the concept of strict liability, and the concomitant concept of mens rea, those who debate 
the legal issue would do far better, I think, simply to proceed as I have done in this paper. For, given the 
repugnance associated with imposing liability in the absence of any concern with moral responsibility, it is 
clear that the moral issue is at the heart of the legal issue. Indeed, this is clearly something which debaters of 
the legal issue have themselves recognized, since their concern with mens rea is obviously rooted in their 
concern with the tie between advertence and responsibility. In fact, those who have professed to be 
discussing the wider legal issue have rarely taken their discussion beyond the bounds of the narrower moral 
issue. But it must be remembered that the legal issue is wider than the moral issue. An implication of my 
account in the main body of this paper is that liability for negligence need not be morally repugnant.27 But it 
does not follow from this alone that it is always morally justifiable to impose such liability. Moreover, if my 
account is incorrect and there is always something morally repugnant about liability for negligence, it does 
not follow from this alone that it is never morally justifiable, all things considered, to impose such liability. 
Thus, while a resolution of the moral issue might, indeed would, aid resolution of the legal issue, resolution 
of the former would not suffice for resolution of the latter. 
 
APPENDIX B: RASHNESS AND RECKLESSNESS 
Negligence may be distinguished from rashness and recklessness. In this appendix I shall try to say what the 
differences between these concepts are. I do not mean to legislate as to use of the terms "rashness" and 
"recklessness," for these may be, and have been, variously used. (This is, of course, also the case with the 
term "negligence.") What I do want to do is to clarify certain important concepts, ones which are 
legitimately, indeed often, expressed by these terms. 
 
Just as negligence is unjustifiable neglect, so are rashness and recklessness unjustifiable. I propose to call 
rashness unjustifiable depreciation (of a certain sort) and recklessness unjustifiable casualness.28 Let us look 
at depreciation first. 
 
Depreciation is like neglect in that it involves advertence to actions and their possible outcomes. But it may 
be distinguished from neglect in two respects. First, it does not necessarily involve subsequent inadvertence 
to these actions or outcomes. Second, it necessarily involves an incorrect assessment of the probabilities of 
the outcomes at issue; indeed, it involves an underestimation of such probabilities. More precisely, we may 
say (where t1 is not later than t2 and t2 not later than t3): 
 
Def.8: P's decision d at t1 is depreciative (to some degree) with respect to event e if and only if for some 
action a: 
(i) d is a decision by P at t1 to do a at t2; and 
(ii) P underestimates at t1 the probability that, in doing a at t2, he is/will be causing at t2 e to occur at 
t3. 
 
By "P underestimates the probability that . . ." I mean: P believes that there is a certain probability n/100 
that…, while there is in fact a higher probability n + m/100 that. . . . The belief may of course be occurrent, 
but it need not be. Degree of depreciation may be said to vary directly with the extent of underestimation at 
issue. If P indeed does a at t2 on the basis of d, then a, too, may be said to be depreciative (with respect to e). 
 
Now, whenever there is underestimation there is overestimation also—and vice versa. If I underestimate the 
probability that some event will occur, I overestimate the probability that it will not occur.29 Thus, whenever 
a decision or action is depreciative with respect to some event, it is also appreciative with respect to the 
negation or complement of that event. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to define rashness explicitly in 
terms of depreciation rather than appreciation. Rashness is unjustifiable depreciation of the following sort: it 
involves the unjustifiable30 underestimation of the probability of some event's occurring, an event which the 
agent believes to be morally untoward.31 Concomitant with this, of course, is the unjustifiable overestimation 
that something untoward will not occur, but this seems to be a more "indirect" way of viewing the matter. At 
any rate, rashness is certainly to be distinguished from what may be called over-caution, which involves the 
unjustifiable overestimation that something untoward will occur (or, equivalently, the unjustifiable 
underestimation that something untoward will not occur). Note that rashness and overcaution may 
accompany one another on certain occasions; for a decision or action may be rash with respect to one event e 
and yet over-cautious with respect to another event f If Smith, a bad swimmer, jumps into a river in order to 
save Jones, a good swimmer, then (given certain conditions) Smith's action is rash with respect to his own 
survival and over-cautious with respect to Jones's survival. 
 
Casualness is like both neglect and depreciation in that it, too, involves advertence to actions and their 
possible outcomes. But it may be distinguished from neglect in that it does not necessarily involve 
subsequent inadvertence to these actions or outcomes. And it may be distinguished from depreciation (and 
appreciation) in that it does not necessarily involve misassessment of the probabilities at issue. What it does 
involve is a lack of intention to avert the anticipated consequence(s). In short, and more precisely (where 
"t1," "t2," and "t3" function as in Def.8): 
 
Def.9: P's decision d at t1 is casual (to some degree) with respect to event e if and only if for some action 
a: 
(i) d is a decision by P at t1 to do a at t2; 
(ii) P estimates at t1 that there is a non-zero probability that, in doing a at t2, he is/will be causing at 
t2 e to occur at t3; and 
(iii) P does not intend at t1 to cause at t2 e to occur at t3. 
 
Degree of casualness may be said to vary directly with the degree of probability at issue. If P indeed does a 
at t2 on the basis of d, then, again, a may be said to be casual (with respect to e). And, again, an unjustifiably 
casual decision or action may be said to be a reckless one.32 
 
It may seem that no decision can be casual, in that, if P decides to do a and believes that, in doing a, he 
might be bringing about e, then he cannot not intend to bring about e. But this is surely mistaken—clearly so 
where P regards the chances of e's occurring as very small, but also where he regards the chances of e's 
occurring as very great. I may decide to go to see a certain movie and believe that, if I do go, you will in all 
likelihood be disappointed; and yet I may not intend to disappoint you. Perhaps it is true that, in such a case, 
I do not intend not to disappoint you—but that is another matter. 
 
While negligence, rashness, and recklessness are, then, clearly distinct from one another, certain connections 
between them may yet be noted. First, I believe that much rashness involves negligence in the following 
way. It has been said that all rashness involves an unjustifiable underestimation of probability. Now, I think 
that it is rare that underestimation is advertent, and it is difficult to see how unjustifiable underestimation 
which is inadvertent can be anything but negligent, that is, negligently caused to occur. At any rate, even if it 
is possible for such underestimation not to be negligent, it is clear that it very often is. Second, some 
negligence may itself involve rashness. This will happen when the negligence is nonbasic and when the 
belief mentioned in clause (i) of Def. 1 is false, by virtue of there being an unjustifiable underestimation of 
the probability of e's occurring given the performance or nonperformance of some of the actions in set B. 
Third, it seems that the decision operative in all negligence not to take precautions must involve either an 
intention that the consequent event e occur or casualness with respect to e; and since the decision is 
unjustifiable, such casualness, if it occurs, constitutes recklessness.33 
 
NOTES 
1. The case is borrowed, in modified form, from Hart (1968), p. 147. 
2. On some views, it is not possible for behavior to be unjustifiable and for its perpetrator not to be 
morally responsible for it. If so, then, insofar as all negligent behavior is unjustifiable, it follows 
trivially that the perpetrator of such behavior is morally responsible for it. Our puzzle is then 
transformed into the following: how is it possible for the sort of advertence-cum-inadvertence, which 
I have said characterizes negligence, to be unjustifiable? 
3. This is a stipulative use of the term "neglect," although such use is supposed to be suggestive. Cf. 
White (1964), pp. 83-4. 
4. This definition is still rough because of clauses (i)(c) and (ii)(b).  
 
Clause (i)(c) may, I believe, be more fully explicated as follows. First, "ascending" should be 
replaced by "non-descending," so that ties in probable efficacy may be accommodated. Secondly, the 
clause, when thus understood, may be re-stated as follows:  
 
(c) (1) if he does just bl at t2, the probability of e's occurring at t3 will be reduced to some extent;  
(2) if he does just b2 at t2, this probability will be no less reduced; and . . . and  
(3) if he does just bn at t2, this probability will be no less reduced.  
 
Two points are to be noted about this re-statement of (i)(c). First, for any member bi of B, we may 
understand the phrase "P does just bi" as follows: P does bi and P does no bi +j, where 0 < j. Second, 
the clause is intended to be compatible with the possibility that, for some members bi and bj of B, bi 
is a complex action with bj as a part.  
 
Clause (ii)(b) may be correspondingly re-stated as follows: 
 
(b) each of these other actions is such that, if he performs it at t2, the probability of e's 
occurring at t3 will be reduced to some extent. 
 
5. See Zimmerman (1984), Ch. 1, for a full elaboration of such treatment.  
6. See Zimmerman (1984), Ch. 8. 
7. Austin (1961), p. 242 for example. 
8. I say "typically," rather than "necessarily," since, first, the belief concerning abilities mentioned in 
clause (i)(a) may be false (as I point out below) and, second, one omits to perform an action only if 
one can perform it. (On the second point, again see Zimmerman (1984), Ch. 8.) 
9. Note that, if the belief in clause (i) is false with respect to sub-clause (a), then it would be misleading 
to say that, by doing a, P does not do any of b1, . . . ,bn. It is for this reason that I have included the 
phrase "nor even attempting to do" in clause (iii)(b). Compare note 8 above. 
10. In this context, "unjustifiably" means the same as "wrongly, all things considered."  
11. Cf. Hart (1968), p. 149. 
12. Hart reports Turner thus, Hart (1968), pp. 138, 146ff. 
13. I say "consistently with this" advisedly, since there can be some tension here. If the event in its 
original setting is highly unlikely then (1) not seeking to prevent it is not very negligent, but also (2) 
there is little chance to reduce the degree of negligence further by taking precautions to prevent it. 
Just what the formula should be to resolve this tension, I am not sure. 
14. Or rather (I think), the degree of negligence may be said to vary directly with the perceived moral 
seriousness of this omission—perceived by P, that is. Again, it might happen that a chain of 
negligence is involved here, in that (for example) P has negligently caused it to be the case that he 
misperceives the seriousness of the omission. 
15. Cf. Hart (1968), p. 149. 
16. Notice that, as with Def.1, there is no stipulation here that e in fact occur or that the belief be 
accurate. 
17. It might facilitate administration of the law, for example. Cf. Prosser (1971), pp. 152-3.  
18. But see note 2 above. 
19. Cf. Frankfurt (1969) and Zimmerman (1982). 
20. Indeed, not only are both P1 and P2 morally responsible for this event but, I would maintain, their 
responsibility is not even diminished to any degree by the fact that the other flipped a switch also. See 
Zimmerman (1985). 
21. This is so even in the case of remote control, I think. For one cannot entertain at t1 that one will 
entertain at t2 that e will occur at t3 unless one entertains at t1 that e will occur at t3. 
22. Hart (1968), p. 136 and elsewhere. 
23. Cf. Wootton (1963). 
24. Hart (1968), Ch. VI. 
25. Cf. Hart (1968), pp. 139-140. 
26. While Wasserstrom (1959-60) appears to accept (I), at times he also appears to flirt with (III). He 
clearly rejects (II). Feinberg (1970), pp. 233-5, accepts the conclusion of (III) at least with respect to 
some varieties of strict liability. 
27. This statement of course presupposes Def.2. If some other definition of negligence is at issue, the 
statement may not hold true. Perhaps this is often the case in the law. It has been noted above that the 
law employs the notion of foreseeability characterized in Del.4, and it may well be that many people 
concerned with the law employ a notion which they call negligence and which is definable in terms 
merely of foreseeability so construed and not of foresight. 
28. Clearly, this use of these terms is stipulative, although it is intended to be suggestive. Cf. note 3 
above. 
29. This is not to say that whenever there is occurrent underestimation there is occurent overestimation, 
or vice versa. 
30. Morally, not (necessarily) epistemically. To say, in this sense, that underestimation is unjustifiable is 
to say that it is wrongly caused to occur. Cf. note 10 above. 
31. I shall not try to say just what "moral untowardness" consists in. Nevertheless, it is this untowardness 
which, coupled with the underestimation at issue, constitues the "riskiness" involved in rashness. In 
"standard" cases of rashness, perhaps, the belief is a true one, but emphasis must be placed on the 
requirement of belief here. Cf note 14 above. 
32. Cf White (1964), p. 86, where it is said that recklessness consists in indifference or lack of care. This 
seems to me doubly wrong, although it is true that recklessness and indifference often accompany 
one another. First, indifference may be justifiable, whereas recklessness cannot be. Second, a reckless 
action may fail to be an indifferent one; lack of intention with respect to an event e may fail to be an 
indication of lack of care with respect to e. 
33. On the relation between recklessness and negligence, see White (1964), p. 85. 
 
I am grateful for the comments of Diana Ackerman, Selmer Bringsjord, Dan Brock, Douglas Husak, John 
Ladd, Itamar Pitowsky, Philip Quinn, Allen Renear, Ernest Sosa, and an anonymous referee. 
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